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Romer and Romer (1989, 1990, 1992) identify dates where the Federal
Reserve appears to have shifted its policy towards reducing the rate of
inflation. This paper examines the economic context that drives this decision.
It finds that the Fed appears to weigh the outlook for unemployment as well
as that for inflation in making its decision about disinflation.
Previous work has not examined the course of inflation over the
disinflations.This paper finds responses of the inflation rate to the
"disinflations" only in a specification where the effects of the policy are
presumed to be permanent. Moreover, the Voicker disinflation is found to be
the only "disinflation" to reduce inflation permanently. The disinflation after
the 1973 OPEC price increases was effective, but only temporarily. Other
disinflations had negligible impacts on the rate of inflation over all horizons.
Variables measuring the expected present discounted values of
unemployment and inflation are constructed. These variables are used in a
discrete-choice model to explain the Fed's decision to disinflate. This model
does a fairly good job of explaining the Fed's decisions. Both inflation and
unemployment drive the Fed's decision. For some episodes, notably in the
1970's, inflation is the main variable driving the decision. In the 1969 and
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and NBERThe Federal Reserve periodically makes decisions to reduce
the rate of inflation. Romer and Romer (1989, also 1990), in a
recent and influential study, identi1' six dates since World War II
when Federal Reserve policy became explicitly disinflationary.
They have recently added a seventh date (Romer and Romer,
1992).1Theyfind evidence of the effectiveness of Fed policy
consistent with the predictions of the neo-Keynesian model. The
disinflations are followed by periods of substantial output and
employment loss.
Romer and Romer, in both their historical and econometric
methodology, treat the changes in Fed policy as exogenous events.
In their examination of the Federal Open Market Committee
[FOMC] minutes, they look explicitly for innovations in Fed policy
concerning the steady-state rate of inflation. They deliberately
avoid an examination of economic conditions in dating the Fed
'The dates identified in Romer and Romer (1989) are 1947:10,
1955:09, 1968:12, 1974:04, 1978:08, and 1979:10. Romer and
Romer (1992) adds 1988:12. The preliminary research for this
paper was carried out before the Romers identified this latest date.
The estimates in this paper, however, incorporate the new Romer
date.-2-
decisions. In their econometric work, they treat these changes in
Fed policy as observed, exogenous impulses that determine the
course of real economic activity and inflation. Hence, the impact
of the policy shifts is estimated by ordinary leastsquares. The
dynamic multipliers implied by these estimates are thus taken as
the impact per se of the policy.
Romer and Romer's perspective of treating policy variables
as exogenous is part of a long tradition. Most studies of the
effectiveness of monetary policy use time-series indicators of
monetary policy such as growth rates of money stocks or interest
rates as predictors of aggregate economic outcomes. By ignoring
the feedback of the economy to policy, these studies treatpolicy
changes as random shocks.
But, of course, decisions by the FOMC to change policy
take place with explicit consideration of economic conditions. A
decision to disinflate is meaningful only if there is aprecondition
of existing high inflation, either actual or expected. Therefore,
there must be feedback from theeconomy to policy-making. Even
if the Fed's actions can be regarded as predetermined,they are-3-
certainly not strictly exogenous. The FOMC is reacting to the
economy and hoping to affect it.
The first part of this paper examines the effects of the
Fed's decision to disinflate. That these decisions are followed by
substantial declines in real activity is well documented in the
Romers' papers. Previous work does not, however, examine the
effect on inflation of the disinflationary shifts in policy. Since
disinflation is the Fed's explicit objective, I develop quantitative
estimates of the disinflationary effect of the policy change in order
to study systematically the decision to undertake it.
The second part of the paper uses what is learned about
the effects of a decision to disinflate to examine its determinants. It
constructs measures of variables driving the Fed's decision to
disinflate. It then develops a discrete-choice model that shows how
these variables explain the Fed's actions.
1. EFFECTS
In discussions of cause and effect, cause usually comes
before effect. Yet, at least insofar as the empirical work for this
paper is concerned, the effects of disinflation need to be studied-4-
first. Presumably, the Fed has an estimate of the impact of its
policy before undertaking it. But in order to model that decision, I
must first construct similar estimates of the costs and benefits of
the decision.
Surprisingly, the literature has not addressed the very basic
question, what is the consequence for inflation of a decision by the
Fed to disinflate? Empirical work by Romer and Romer
documents the costs of a decision to disinflate. They show
forecasts of production and unemployment responding to these
Federal Reserve Policy shifts. Taken for granted is that the
disinflationary episodes have a favorable impact on inflation. For
the empirical modelling of the decision to disinflate, I need,
however, a quantitative estimate of the benefits as well as the costs.
Therefore, I will examine in some detail the anti-inflation
consequences of the disinflations.
1.1.Specification of the inflation process
The variables I consider are inflation measured by the
consumer price index, the civilian unemployment rate, and the-5-
Romer dummies.2 The goal of this section is to develop forecasts
of inflation and unemployment conditional on a policy change.
These forecasts will then be used as an input into the model of
Fed decisions in Section 2.
Since the aim of this section is to develop forecasts, it relies
on simple time-series models of inflation and unemployment
conditional on their own lags and lags of the Romer dummies.
I present both univariate estimates and bivariate estimates, where
lags of the unemployment rate appear in the inflation equation and
vice versa.
Figures 1 and 2 present the basic data. The unemployment
rate has a clear and well-known upward trend for most of the
2The data are quarterly. The monthly Romer dummies are
converted to quarterly as dummies for quarters during which a
Romer date occurs. The inflation rate is measured as the three-
month percent change (log-differences at annual rate) for the
quarter. The unemployment rate is the average for the quarter.
The sample period is from 1953:1 to 1992:4 (see below for
discussion of sample period). The sample period refers to range of
the dependent variables in any equation estimated, so in those
involving lags, the appropriate pre-sample data are used.-6-
sample.In the econometric work that follows, the unemployment
rate is detrended with a linear trend. The trend arises because of
labor-market phenomena not closely linked to short-run Fed
policy, so abstracting from the trend seems appropriate.
Specification of the inflation process is more problematic.
As a matter of theory, it is desirable to allow for persistent impacts
of the decision to disinflate on the level of inflation. Only finite
lags of the Romer dates are entered into the equations. Hence, in
an equation that has the level of inflation as the left-hand-side
variable, a policy change will have only temporary, although
possibly very persistent, impacts on the inflation rate. In a
specification where the difference of inflation is the dependent
variable, they will in general have permanent effects, although the
long-run effect could be small.
Of course, the empirical persistence of the inflation process
must be considered. Previous work has found post-World War II
inflation, in contrast with earlier samples [see Barsky (1987)], to be
very persistent. The persistence of inflation is, however, very
sensitive to the sample period. As we get more and more
observations after the Volcker disinflation, inflation looks more-7-
mean-reverting. But even more important is how the earlier years
of the post-War period are treated. The period 1947-1952 has
dramatic swings in inflation associated with the post-World War II
and Korean War business cycles and with price controls and their
aftermath. Consequently, estimates in this paper are carried out
over the period beginning in 1953. No claim is made that the
results are robust to inclusion of the 1947-1952 period. Quite the
contrary, the results are very sensitive to inclusion of this period.
Since there are strong a priori grounds for expecting the early
period to be different from the later, including it in the sample
would not shed much light on behavior of the economy during the
bulk of the post-war period.
Table 1 documents this sensitivity of the inflation process to
the sample period. It reports the regression results of the change
of inflation on seven of its own lags and the lagged level. The
table reports the implied largest autoregressive root of the level of
inflation and its t-statistic for the null that it is unity. Both these
statistics have Dickey-Fuller (1981) distributions. The first three
rows report results starting in 1947. These document the instability
of the inflation process in the early period. For both the 1947--8-
1992 and 1947-1979 periods, inflation is estimated to be rapidly
mean-reverting (largest roots of 0.68 or 0.66). But the next rows
show that much of the mean-reversion over the post-war period
arises from the 1947-1952 period. This period had very
unpersistent inflation (root of 0.19). On account of this very
different behavior, together with the Korean War price controls, I
start the sample in 1953.
In the 1953-1992 period, inflation is just on the boundary
between accepting and rejecting the unit-root hypothesis. The
largest autoregressive root is 0.84; the Dickey-Fuller t-statistic of -
2.97is marginal at conventional significance levels. The last row
shows that even in the 1953-1992 period, there are important
changes in the persistence of unemployment. In the 1953-1979
period, the root is much closer to unity and the test-statistic is in
the region of non-rejection. Inflation looked very persistent over
this period. Since the Volcker disinflation of the 1980's, it looks
more mean-reverting. As I will argue later in this section, the
Volcker disinflation is a singular event, so it is hard to predict its
lasting consequences for the process of inflation.-9-
In light of the sensitivity of the inflation process to
specification and sample period, many of the results of this paper
will be presented for specifications using both the level and
difference of inflation. It is already clear from Table 1 that certain
results, those concerning inflation, will be sensitive to the
specification of its process. But other results, in particular those
relating to unemployment, are not.
1.2.Results: Effects of Policy Changes
Let ir1bethe inflation rate and u be the unemployment
rate. The equations to estimate what happens after a Romer date





whereEiristhe change of the inflation rate, R is the dummy
variable that is one on a Romer date and zero otherwise, and A(L)
and D(L) are polynomials in the lag operator. The A(L)
polynomials are eighth-order and unrestricted.3 The D(L)
polynomials, which capture the impact of the Romer dates, include
lags one through sixteen and are estimated as fourth-order
polynomially-distributed lags with the far endpoint restricted to
zero.4 When estimated as unrestricted, the lag distributions are
noisier, but have basically the same dynamics.
The coefficients f3areconstrained to be zero in the
nonstationary specification of inflation and freely estimated when
inflation is allowed to be stationary. Including the lagged level of
inflation.in the equations is equivalent to respeci!'ing the
3The A(L) polynomial also is such that the current value irof
the inflation rate is included in the equation for unemployment.
This is merely a normalization to make the error terms
uncorrelated. It is equivalent to using the triangularization popular
in the literature on vector autoregressions.
4Sixteen lags is long enough so that the endpoint restriction is
not strongly binding.- 11-
equationsin terms of the level of inflation. This normalization
facilitates comparison of the estimated coefficients across the
specifications of the inflation process.5
1.2.1. Univariate Estimates
The results for the univariate estimates are presented in
Tables 2 and 3 and Figures 2a and 3a. Consider first the estimates
for unemployment (the same in both tables).6 Unemployment has
the hump-shaped dynamics that is typical of real aggregates. After
a shock to unemployment, it continues in the same direction for
several quarters before slowly reverting to trend. The Romer dates
increase unemployment gradually. Figure 2a shows the
convolution of the Romer dates and the own-lags of
unemployment. Following a Romer date, unemployment gradually
5To make the nonstationary and stationary models have the
same degrees of freedom, when inflation is allowed to be stationary
by including the lagged level ii-,Iinclude only seven lags in the
polynomials in
6Recallthat here and throughout that u is the deviation of
unemployment from a linear trend.- 12-
increasesto a peak level of 1.73 in the fifteenth quarter after the
shocks and then slowly reverts to trend. As subsequent figures
show, these dynamics are essentially invariant to the specification
of the inflation rate and to whether a univariate or bivariate system
is estimated. They replicate the findings presented by Romer and
Romer (1989). The tables give the F-statistic for the null
hypothesis that the all of the coefficients of the Romer dates are
zero.7 For unemployment, this hypothesis is rejected at the 0.03
level.
The constant of the unemployment rate equation has an
interesting interpretation. Since the variable u1 is zero mean, it
would be zero but for the inclusion of the dummies for disinflation.
The estimated coefficient indicates that the Romer dates increase
the average unemployment rate by about one-tenth of one
percentage point.
Now consider the estimates of the inflation process.
7Because the lags of the Romer are estimated as a fourth-order
polynomial with a far endpoint constraint, the hypothesis has only
three restrictions.- 13-
Evenconditioning on the Romer dates, inflation is persistent. The
coefficient of the lagged level of inflation in Table 3 is not
significantly different from zero. Hence, inclusion of the Romer
dummies does not affect the unit-roots tests reported in Table 1.
Inflation is, however, less persistent than a random walk (see the
negative coefficients of the lagged sir).Thecoefficients of the
lagged Romer dates have similar patterns in Table 2 and Table 3.
Following a Romer date, inflation continues to accelerate for two
quarters and then decelerates. The joint test that the coefficients
Romer dates are all zero rejects for the nonstationary, but not for
the stationary specification.
The dynamic response of inflation to the Romer dates is
again easiest to see in the .figures. Figure 2a gives the response for
the univariate, inflation-nonstationary model; Figure 3a gives it for
the univariate, inflation-stationary model. Both figures report the
response of the ijofinflation to a Romer date. For the
nonstationary specification in Figure 2a, inflation continues to
accelerate for several quarters. It then decelerates until it levels
off after about four years at a level five percentage points lower
than where it began. This change is economically significant. The- 14-
standarderror of the inflation equation is about 2 percentage
points, so the reduction is 2-1/2 times the innovation's standard
error. But as will be shown in Section 1.2.3, the magnitude of the
change is attributable largely to the Volcker disinflation.
The pattern for the stationary-inflation model in Figure 3a
is similar, although the magnitudes are not. The maximum
reduction in inflation is only about 3 percentage points, and, of
course, it is temporary. Moreover, recall that the coefficients of
the Romer dates are not significantly different from zero in the
estimates reported in Table 3, so the projected disinflation is not
statistically significant.
1.2.2. Multivariate estimates
Tables 4 and 5andFigures 2b and 3b report the results of
estimating the multivariate model where the change in inflation
and the level of unemployment are regressed on their own lags and- 15-
lagsof the unemployment rate.8 Both nonstationary- and
stationary-inflation models are again estimated.
Figures 2b and 3b report the total responses to a Romer
date. That is, for inflation, the changes in lagged unemployment
are taken into account and vice versa. The estimated response of
unemployment and inflation to disinflations are very similar to the
corresponding estimates for the univariate models in the (a) panels
of the figures. The similarity of the univariate and multivariate
estimates of the response of inflation and unemployment to a
disinflation disguises interesting differences that are revealed in the
estimates of the equations reported in the tables. In the
unemployment equation, the coefficients of the Romer dates do
not change much between Tables .2 and 4. Including the lagged
changes in inflation only slightly attenuates the coefficients of the
Romer dates in the unemployment equation in Table 4. They
remain statistically significant, although at the 0.06 rather than 0.03
level.
8Also, the current change in inflation is included in the
unemployment rate regression to normalize the residuals to be
uncorrelated.- 16-
Onthe other hand, when lags of unemployment are
included in the equation for the change in inflation in Table 4, the
coefficients of the Romer dates get considerably smaller than those
in the univariate model in Table 2. Moreover, the coefficients of
the Romer dates in the inflation equation in Table 4 are jointly
statistically insignificant (p-value of the F-statistic is 0.51). Hence,
the impact on inflation of the Romer dates in the multivariate
system operates indirectly through the impact of lagged
unemployment rather than directly in the inflation equation. Since
the estimated equations are reduced form, they need to be
interpreted with caution. Yet, the absence of an independent
impact of the Romer dates on inflation does suggest that
disinflations operate through the Phillips curve rather than by
independent shifts in the inflationary regime.
Including the lagged unemployment rates in the equation
for inflation in the stationary specification has a similar effect
(compare Tables 3 and 5).Thecoefficients of the Romer dates in
the inflation equation in Table 5aresubstantially smaller than
those in Table 3. But they are insignificant in both the univariate- 17-
andmultivariate equations, so the difference in the magnitudes of
the coefficient estimates should not be overinterpreted.
1.2.3. Disinflations Episode-by-Episode
In the inflation-nonstationary specification, the estimates
reported in this section imply that the disinflations have, on
average, a substantial, permanent effect on the inflation rate.
These come at a cost of high unemployment for a period of years.
But as Feldstein (1979) points out, a permanent gain from lower
inflation could well outweigh the temporary output loss.
The estimates based on the regressions for the whole
period have important limitations. Specifically, they impose that
the magnitude of the disinflation is the same across episodes.9 It
could well be that certain episodes represented much more
substantial contractions than others. In this subsection, I present
evidence that reveals what success the Fed had in reducing the rate
of inflation following each Romer date.
am grateful to Saul Hymans and Phil Howrey for stressing
this issue to me.- 18-
Toexamine the impact of the disinflations episodically, I
use the following simple, nonparametric procedure. I estimate a
univariate autoregression of the change of inflation over the entire
sample. The equation includes a constant and eight lags of iir,
butno Romer dummies. Figure 4 shows graphs of the cumulative
forecast error for the ofinflation from the quarter before
each Romer date.1° The solid lines are the forecast errors, the
dashed lines are the one-standard-deviation error bands. For
example, in Figure 4c, inflation is almost 8 percent lower in 1976:1,
eight quarters after the Romer date, than it was forecast to be in
1974:1, the quarter before the decision to disinflate.
Figure 4 shows that, except for the October 1979 Volcker
disinflation, none of the decisions to disinflate had a permanent
impact on the level of inflation. (Figure 4d credits the August
1978 disinflation with a long-run impact, but the forecast errors do
not turn negative until after the October 1979 date.) Forecast
errors after the September 1955 (Figure 4a) episode were large
'°Romer and Romer (1989, Figure 3) provide an analogous
figure for the unemployment rate.- 19-
andpositive. After the December 1968 (Figure 4b) episode, the
errors were small--first positive and then negative. In the
disinflation following the first OPEC price increase (Figure 4c),
there were persistent and large negative forecast errors. Over the
two year horizon, there were substantial reductions in the realized
rate of inflation relative to expectation, but these begin to dissipate
in 1976. By early 1978 (note that this date is before the second
OPEC oil price increase), inflation is close to its pre-disinflation
expected value. Hence, if this episode is to be counted as a
success, there must be some offsetting failure subsequent to it.
Moreover, the failure of the OPEC I disinflation to have lasting
benefits cannot be blamed on OPEC II. Any success had
dissipated before the second oil shock.
Figure 4d tells the story of the August 1978 disinflation. It
totally failed to affect the forecast errors. They remain positive in
the first six quarters. The subsequent reductions in inflation
occurred after the 1979 episode.
The October 1979 episode is the outstanding success. It
heralded a sustained, large reduction in the rate of inflation. Five
years after it, the rate of inflation was 8.5 percentage points lower- 20-
thanwould have been forecast in the quarter before the decision to
disinflate. From Figure 4, it is clear that this data point is virtually
alone in driving the estimates of the long-run effect of the Romer
dummies on inflation presented in the previous subsections.
Finally, Figure 4f reports the effect of the most recent
episode. After bouncing around for several years, the forecast
error does settle down below zero, but it is well within the one-
standard-deviation band.
1.2.4 Discussion
The large estimated response of the inflation rate to the
decision to disinflate is driven by the success of the Volcker
disinflation. Following the 1955, 1968, 1978, and 1988 decisions,
forecast errors for inflation were positive or mixed. The 1974
episode was a temporary success, but inflation reasserted itself
even before the second round of OPEC price increases. Perhaps it
should not be surprising that the Volcker episode looks uniquely
successful. Figure la shows how inflation continued to rise after
each disinflation, even if there was a temporary retreat. Moreover,- 21-
hadthe previous episodes been successful, the conditions that
fostered the Volcker change in policy would not have been present.
These results do not necessarily imply, however, that the
future rate of inflation is not a primary variable of concern in
motivating the Fed to disinflate. The Fed could act in the hope of
having a success along the lines that Volcker did, even if in most
cases these hopes are not realized. This issue of how the Fed
reacts to inflation is addressed in the next section.
2. CAUSE
This section attempts to model the decision of the Fed to
disinflate. In it I first calculate measures of the costs and benefits
of the decision to disinflate. The estimates of the previous section
are inputs into these calculations. I then estimate a discrete-choice
model of the decision to disinflate based on these measures of
costs and benefits.
The structure of the model is as follows. Let R be the
Fed's intolerance of inflation. This is an unobserved, continuous
variable. When it exceeds a threshold (normalized to be zero), the
Fed decides it is worthwhile to subject the economy to a- 22-
disinflation.The structure of the econometric specification
parallels that of the discrete-choice literature. The latent
intolerance to inflation is modelled as a linear function of
observables, X:
R =x1/3 + (2)
When the intolerance exceeds the threshold, the Fed decides to
change policy. That is,
R =1when R' >0. (3)
In this section, I first consider the variables that determine the
decision to disinflate (Xe). Then I use those variables to estimate
the discrete-choice model.
2.1.Variables Determining the Decision to Disinflate
This section of the paper develops variables that are meant
to explain the Fed's decision to disinflate. The obvious candidates- 23-
aremeasures relating to unemployment (the cost of disinflation)
and inflation (the potential benefit). In periods of higb inflation,
the Fed should be more likely to be contemplating a disinflation.
In periods of high expected unemployment, the cost of disinflating
is higher, so the Fed is less likely to make the economy suffer from
a disinflation.
One approach would be to make the determining variables
X simply lags of the unemployment and inflation. But such a
model would be misspecifled on several grounds. First, presumably
what the Fed is contemplating is the impact of its decision on
future economic outcomes. Hence, the variables should be forward
looking, although they should not use future information.
Second, inflation and unemployment are inertial. The
quarter after a decision to disinflate, they will be about the same as
they were when the decision was made. If the X were based on
the current values of unemployment and inflation, equations 2 and
3 would continue to predict changes in policy even after they had
taken place. To avoid this misspecification, the variables X1 must
ratchet as a consequence of previous decision to disinflate. Again,
this can be accomplished by making them forward looking.- 24-
Forecastsof unemployment and inflation can react instantaneously
even if the actual variables are sluggish.
Several other considerations about the specification of X
are driven by the fact that there are only a few episodes of policy
change. The list of variables must be short. With an
unparsimonious specification and only six disinflations in the
sample, it would be very easy to overfit the model. Moreover,
again because of the small number of episodes, there is little scope
to let the data guide the choice of variables without running the
risk that all fit is spurious.
With these considerations in mind, I use the following two
measures as determinants of Federal Reserve decisions to
disinflate. They are the expected present discounted value of the
level of inflation and the expected present discounted value of
unemployment.
These variables capture what one hopes are the central
concerns of the Fed when it contemplates a change in aggregate
policy. They are forward looking but based on current information
and they summarize parsimoniously the current outlook conditional
on whether or not a disinflation has recently occurred. Moreover,- 25 -
theyare highly correlated with other variables that might be
considered as candidates for driving the Fed's decision. In Section
2.2.2, I discuss the robustness of the posited measures to various
changes in the specification.
These variables are calculated using the estimates
developed in Section 1 of the paper. The relevant variables are
forecast into the indefinite future for each point in the sample.
The summary measures are calculated based on these forecasts. I
then calculate their expected present discounted value using a 2
percent per quarter discount rate. The robustness of the measures
to the discount rate is also considered below.
Note that the present value of the inflation rate might be a
key determinant of the decision to disinflate despite the limited
effect of the disinflations on inflation in most episodes. The Fed
might react to the inflation rate even if it turns out it does not, in
practice, succeed in changing it.- 26-
2.2.Variables Determining the Decision to Disinflate
2.2.1. Estimates of the Present Discounted Value of Forecasted
Inflation and Unemployment
Figure 5givesthe estimated determinants of the decision to
disinflate. The estimates are based on the multivariate system
presented in Table 4•h1Theyare normalized by multiplying by
one minus the discount rate so that the units are roughly at annual
rate. In this section of the paper, only estimates based on the
nonstationaly inflation model will be presented. In the next
subsection, I show that the present discounted value of forecast
inflation is not that sensitive to the stationarity versus
nonstationarity of inflation.
Figure 5a graphs the present discounted value of the
forecasted inflation rate. Its low frequency movements track the
actual inflation rate. The variable does ratchet down after Romer
dates, but there are also fairly large changes not associated with
Romer dates. Recall that the permanent effect of a Romer date is
11The equation for unemployment does not include the current
change in inflation when it is used in this section.-27-
only 2-1/2 times the standard deviations of the innovation variance,
so there can be expected to be large swings independent of the
Romer dates.
The present discounted value of expected unemployment is
given in Figure Sb. It falls steadily until a Romer date is
encountered and then ratchets up once the disinflation occurs.
Unlike inflation, the Romer dates appear to be the predominate
factor in unemployment's business-cycle movements.
2.2.2. Robustness
As noted above, there is little scope for experimentation
with the variables to be included in the model for estimating the
probability of disinflation. Yet, since there is also little theoretical
guidance as to the precise form of these variables. Therefore, one
should be concerned whether the measures of the variables driving
the Fed's decisions are robust to plausible perturbations of their
specification. In this subsection, I consider how various alternative
measures correlate with the ones used in the probit estimates.- 28-
Aplausible alternative measure of the inflation rate would
be the long-run or asymptotic forecast of its level.'2 This measure
is very highly correlated with the one used in the present paper.
Indeed, the correlation is 0.987, so the measures are roughly
interchangeable.
In Section 1, very different results were obtained for the
stationary versus nonstationary specifications of the inflation rate.
Two factors mitigate against there being much of a difference
between these specifications for calculating present discounted
values. First, the pattern of the change for the first four years is
about the same. Second, discounting makes the differences in the
distant years not matter much. Consequently, the correlation
between the present discounted value of expected inflation for
inflation-stationary and nonstationary is 0.986 for the discount rate
of 0.02 per quarter.'3
12Earlier drafts of this paper used this measure.
"This calculation should be taken with a grain of salt, however,
because of the statistical insignificance of the Romer dates in the
stationary specification of inflation. For this reason, I focus on the
inflation nonstationary model.- 29-
Finally,over plausible ranges of discount rates, the
expected present discounted values remain highly coherent. This
paper uses a 0.02 quarterly discount rate in calculating the
expected present discounted value of inflation and unemployment.
Compare these to those calculated with an extremely high discount
rate, say 0.10 per quarter: The correlation of the inflation measure
discounted with 0.02 versus 0.10 is 0.965; for unemployment, it is
0.964.
2.3.Estimated Probability of Disinflation
The model in equations 2 and 3 are estimated using a
probit specification of the disturbance. The explanatory variables
are the lagged values of the expected present discounted value of
inflation and unemployment. Model 1 uses just the inflation
variable, model 2 uses just the unemployment variable, model 3
uses both. Expected inflation has the predicted impact on the
decision to disinflate. Higher inflation raises the probability. The
coefficient is strongly statistically significant. Likewise, expected
unemployment also has the predicted impact. Lower
unemployment raises the probability of disinflation, but the- 30-
estimateis only marginally statistically significant. Including both
variables does not alter much the magnitude of the estimated
coefficients, indicating that they have an independent impact on
the probability of a disinflation.
The estimated probit coefficients are difficult to interpret.
Figures 6 through 8 give the implied probability of disinflation
period-by-period for the three models. Except for the first
disinflation, which this specification totally fails to predict, the
probabilities have local peaks around the Romer dates. For the
models including inflation, for just one date, the 1974 disinflation,
does the probability of a disinflation exceed one half. Hence, the
model does not do a good job of pinpointing the particular quarter
when the disinflation will take place. But the probability is high
over adjacent quarters, so the model does attribute a high
probability to a disinflation taking place in the year that they
occur.14
14Recall that the disinflations are rare. In a sample of 180
quarters, only seven occur. Hence, the unconditional probability of
one occurring in any given quarter is less than 4 percent. The
fitted probabilities should thus be judged against this baseline, not- 31-
Giventhe low t-statistic of the unemployment variable in
the estimates, it does not do a good job of tracking the decisions.
Yet, Figure 7 illustrates the role it has in explaining disinflation.
The probability slowly increases as unemployment falls prior to a
Romer date. Since unemployment is so persistent, the variable
does little to pinpoint that particular quarter of the disinflation.
Hence, the low t-statistic. Yet, the integral of the probability over
the quarters leading up to the disinflation would indicate the
strong probability of a disinflation sometime during the period of
low unemployment.
Consider the episodes in turn. As already has been noted,
the 1955 episode is not explained by the model. Neither was
unemployment expected to be particularly low nor was inflation
particularly high.
The probability of disinflation grew steadily in the later
1960's until the 1969 episode. Comparing Figures 6 and 7, this
a baseline developed for cross-section studies where the number of
zeros and ones in the explanatory variable are of the same order of
magnitude.- 32-
fittedprobability is mainly associated with the unemployment
variable.
The 1974 decision is the one most sharply predicted by the
model. It combined the maximum expected inflation with fairly
low expected unemployment (see Figure 7).
The next two best predicted decisions are the pair in the
late 1970's. Inflation is the driving factor. Indeed, once
unemployment is taken into account, the Volcker disinflation in
1979 has a lower fitted probability than when only inflation is
included in the model (compare Figures 6 and 8). Why is the most
successful disinflation not the most likely? It is precisely because
expected unemployment was fairly high in late 1979, partially as a
consequence of the failed disinflation of the previous year.
Finally, Romer and Romer (1992) have dated a seventh
post-World War II disinflation in late 1988. The model concurs.
It begins to predict a disinflation in 1987 based on the drift
downward in the unemployment rate beginning in the mid-1980s.- 33-
Aswith the 1969 episode, low unemployment rather than high
inflation is the primary explanatory factor.15
Figure 9 presents estimates of a model that is intentionally
misspecified. It uses estimates of the expected present discounted
value of inflation and unemployment as explanatory variables in
the probit that are based on a vector autoregression that do not
include the Romer dates as explanatory variables. These results
illustrate the importance of allowing the forcing variables to ratchet
down after a Romer date. Because inflation and unemployment
are persistent, the predictions using these forecasts tend to lag the
events. The misspecified model continues to predict disinflations
well after they have happened.
But perhaps more importantly, the results in Figure 9
provide some evidence that the results in the previous figures are
not rigged by virtue of including the Romer date dummies as
lagged variables in constructing the explanatory variables for the
15AS a test of the specification and to further evaluate the new
Romer date, I estimated the probit using data fit only through
1985 and then estimated the probabilities for the 1986-1992 period.
They match quite closely those reported in Figure 8.- 34-
probits.The fitted probabilities indeed do rise in the quarters
before the Romer dates with much the same pattern as in Figure 8.
An exception is the 1979 episode, which is better fit by the model
reported in Figure 9. With this model, the cost of the disinflation
is not being affected by the response of forecasted unemployment
to the 1978 episode.
3. SUMMARY
This paper examines the Fed's decision to disinflate. It
focusses on the role of pre-existing economic conditions in the
decisions. It finds that these decisions are driven both by the
prevailing unemployment and inflation rates. Even in periods of
high inflation, the Fed will be relatively unwilling to disinflate if the
rate of unemployment is otherwise expected to be high. Similarly,
especially for the 1969 and 1988 episode, low unemployment rather
than high inflation seems to explain the Fed's action.
In planning this paper, I expected estimating the inflation
process to be merely a side issue. But the analysis of the inflation
process proves very interesting in itself. While on average the
"disinflations" do reduce the rate of inflation subsequently, this- 35 -
averageresult is driven almost entirely by the 1979 episode. This
leads one to ask, what is the Fed accomplishing by putting the
economy into a recession? Perhaps, it is responding to incipient
inflation that is signalled by low unemployment. These could arise
through nonlinearities in the Phillips curve not captured in simple
specifications. Indeed, perhaps we do not see that region of the
Phillips curve because the Fed never lets unemployment get so low.
In any case, the economics profession's recent view that the Fed
has had great success in reducing the rate of inflation, albeit with a
temporary output loss, is largely colored by the achievement of the
Volcker disinflation. Over the post-World War II period, the
average disinflationary episode has done little to reduce the rate of
inflation despite clear evidence that the changes in policy do cause
unemployment to rise substantially.- 36-
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Table reports Dickey-Fuller (1981) regression of the change
of inflation (7 lags) and a constant (no trend). It reports the
implied largest autoregressive root of the level of inflation and
the Dickey-Fuller t—statistic for the null hypothesis that it is
unity.Table 2
Estimated Response of Inflation and Unemployment
Inflation Nonstationary, Univariate Estimates
independentlags u
variables







Mr 7 0.08 (0.09)
Mr 8 —0.12 (0.07)
u 1 1.61 (0.08)
u 2 —0.77 (0.15)
U 3 0.02 (0.16)
u 4 —0.08 (0.16)
u 5 0.19 (0.16)
u 6 0.06 (0.16)
u 7 —0.22 (0.15)
u 8 0.11 (0.08)
R 1 0.51 (0.71) 0.07 (0.10)
R 2 0.11 (0.50) 0.09 (0.07)
R 3 —0.23 (0.41) 0.11 (0.06)
R 4 —0.50 (0.39) 0.12 (0.06)
R 5 —0.72 (0.39) 0.13 (0.06)
R 6 —0.89 (0.39) 0.15 (0.06)
R 7 —1.00 (0.38) 0.15 (0.06)
R 8 —1.07 (0.36) 0.16 (0.06)
R 9 —1.10 (0.35) 0.16 (0.06)
R 10 —1.09 (0.36) 0.16 (0.06)
R 11 —1.04 (0.38) 0.15 (0.06)
R 12 —0.96 (0.41) 0.15 (0.07)
R 13 —0.85 (0.44) 0.13 (0.07)
R 14 —0.72 (0.44) 0.12 (0.07)
R 15 —0.56 (0.41) 0.09 (0.06)





Note: Autoregression of change of inflation (Mr) and
detrended unemployment (u) on own lags and Romer dates (R).
Standard errors are in parenthesis. S.E.E. is standard
error of regression. 2 is adjusted coefficient of
determination. F(3140) and p-value are the F-statistic and
rejection probability for the hypothesis the coefficients of R
are jointly zero.Table 3
Estimated Response of Inflation and Unemployment
Inflation Stationary, Univariate Estimates
independentlags Air u
variables
constant 0.65 0.28 —0.07 (0.03)
1 —0.09 0.08
Air 1 —0.56 0.11
Air 2 —0.33 0.12
Air 3 0.02 0.12
Air 4 0.01 0.11
Air 5 0.05 0.11
Air 6 0.12 0.10
Air 7 0.17 0.07
u 1 1.61 (0.08)
u 2 —0.77 (0.15)
u 3 0.02 (0.16)
u 4 —0.08 (0.16)
u 5 0.19 (0.16)
U 6 0.06 (0.16)
U 7 —0.22 (0.15)
u 8 0.11 (0.08)
R 1 0.68 0.74 0.07 (0.10)
R 2 0.27 0.55 0.09 (0.07)
R 3 —0.07 0.48 0.11 (0.06)
R 4 —0.33 0.47 0.12 (0.06)
R 5 —0.53 0.49 0.13 (0.06)
R 6 —0.67 0.50 0.15 (0.06)
R 7 —0.75 0.49 0.15 (0.06)
R 8 —0.79 0.49 0.16 (0.06)
R 9 —0.79 0.48 0.16 (0.06)
R 10 —0.75 0.48 0.16 (0.06)
R 11 —0.69 0.49 0.15 (0.06)
R 12 —0.60 0.50 0.15 (0.07)
R 13 —0.50 0.50 0.13 (0.07)
R 14 —0.39 0.49 0.12 (0.07)
R 15 —0.28 0.44 0.09 (0.06)





Note: Autoregression of change of inflation (Air) and
detrended unemployment (u) on own lags and Romer dates (B).
Lagged level of inflation included to render inflation
stationary.
See also note to Table 2.Table 4
Estimated Response of Inflation and Unemployment
Inflation Nonstationary, Nultivariate Estimates
independentlags u
variables
constant 0.23 (0.21) —0.06 (0.03)
Air 0 —0.01 (0.01)
Air 1 —0.73 (0.08) 0.00 (0.02)
Air 2 —0.47 (0.10) 0.01 (0.02)
Air 3 —0.10 (0.11) —0.02 (0.02)
Air 4 —0.06 (0.11) 0.00 (0.02)
Air 5 0.05 (0.11) 0.01 (0.02)
Air 6 0.16 (0.10) 0.00 (0.02)
Air 7 0.19 (0.09) 0.01 (0.01)
Air 8 —0.03 (0.07) 0.00 (0.01)
u 1 —2.73 (0.50) 1.60 (0.09)
u 2 3.42 (0.95) —0.71 (0.16)
u 3 —0.83 (1.02) —0.07 (0.17)
u 4 —1.13 (1.02) —0.09 (0.17)
u 5 1.56 (1.01) 0.34 (0.17)
u 6 —1.22 (1.04) —0.06 (0.17)
U 7 1.60 (0.95) —0.19 (0.16)
u 8 —0.88 (0.50) 0.12 (0.08)
R 1 0.20 (0.65) 0.06 (0.11)
R 2 —0.01 (0.46) 0.08 (0.08)
R 3 —0.18 (0.38) 0.09 (0.06)
R 4 —0.31 (0.36) 0.11 (0.06)
R 5 —0.41 (0.37) 0.12 (0.06)
R 6 —0.48 (0.37) 0.13 (0.06)
R 7 —0.52 (0.37) 0.14 (0.06)
R 8 —0.53 (0.35) 0.15 (0.06)
R 9 —0.53 (0.35) 0.15 (0.06)
R 10 —0.50 (0.36) 0.15 (0.06)
R 11 —0.46 (0.38) 0.15 (0.06)
R 12 —0.41 (0.40) 0.14 (0.07)
R 13 —0.35 (0.42) 0.13 (0.07)
R 14 —0.28 (0.42) 0.12 (0.07)
R 15 —0.20 (0.39) 0.10 (0.06)





Note: Vector autoregressions of change of inflation (Air)
and detrended unemployment (u) on own lags and Romer dates (R).
Current Air included in equation for u to triangularize the
system.
See also note to Table 2.Table 5
Estimated Response of Inflation and Unemployment
Inflation Stationary, Multivariate Estimates
independentlags u
variables
constant 0.35 (0.26) —0.08 (0.04)
iT 1 —0.05 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01)
Air 0 —0.01 (0.01)
Air 1 —0.69 (0.11) —0.00 (0.02)
Air 2 —0.43 (0.12) 0.00 (0.02)
Air 3 —0.06 (0.13) —0.02 (0.02)
Air 4 —0.03 (0.12) 0.00 (0.02)
Air 5 0.08 (0.11) 0.01 (0.02)
Air 6 0.19 (0.10) —0.00 (0.02)
Air 7 0.21 (0.07) 0.01 (0.01) U 1 —2.73 (0.50) 1.60 (0.09) U 2 3.41 (0.94) —0.71 (0.16) U 3 —0.81 (1.02) —0.07 (0.17) u 4 —1.15 (1.02) —0.08 (0.17) U 5 1.57 (1.01) 0.34 (0.17) u 6 —1.18 (1.04) —0.06 (0.17) U 7 1.57 (0.95) —0.19 (0.16) u 8 —0.87 (0.49) 0.12 (0.08) R 1 0.32 (0.68) 0.04 (0.11) R 2 0.12 (0.51) 0.06 (0.09) R 3 —0.03 (0.45) 0.07 (0.08) R 4 —0.15 (0.45) 0.09 (0.08) R 5 —0.24 (0.47) 0.10 (0.08) R 6 —0.30 (0.48) 0.11 (0.08) R 7 —0.33 (0.47) 0.12 (0.08) R 8 —0.34 (0.47) 0.12 (0.08) R 9 —0.33 (0.46) 0.13 (0.08) R 10 —0.31 (0.46) 0.13 (0.08) R 11 —0.27 (0.46) 0.13 (0.08)
R 12 —0.23 (0.47) 0.12 (0.08)
R 13 —0.18 (0.47) 0.11 (0.08)
R 14 —0.13 (0.46) 0.10 (0.08)
R 15 —0.09 (0.41) 0.08 (0.07)





Note: Vector autoregressions of change of inflation (Air)
and detrended unemployment (u) on own lags and Romer dates (R).
Lagged level of inflation included to render inflation
stationary. Current Airincludedin equation for u to
triangularize the system.
See also note to Table 2.Table 6
Decision to Disinflate: Probit Estimates
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
constant —4.04 —1.92 —4.25
(0.82) (0.23) (0.89)
PDV inflation 0.35 0.36
(0.11) (0.12)
PDV unemployment —1.62 —1.61
(0.92) (0.99)
log likelihood —19.98 —23.69 —18.29
Probit estimates using values of the expected present
discounted value (PDV) of inflation and unemployment
as explanatory vriables for Fed decisions to disinf late. See



















Figure 1.Inflation, Unemployment and the Decision to Disinflote
(a) InflationRate(4—quarter)
(b) Unemployment Rote
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Note:Vertical lines are Rorner dates










Figure 2. Response o? Unemployment and Inflation to a Romer Dote
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Figure 3. Response of Unemploymen[ and Inflation to a Romer Dote
(a) Univariate Estimates. Intlation Stationary
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(b) Multivariate Estimates. Inf lotion Stationary
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Figure 5. Variables Determining Decision of' Fed to Disinflate
(a) Present Discounted Value of Expected Inflation
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Figure 6. Estimated Probability of Disinflation
Model 1: Expected Inrlotion Only Determining Disinrlotion
1953 1957 1961 1965 1969 1973 1977 1981 1985 I989
Note:Verticol lines cre Rneer dotesFigure 7. Estimated Probability of Disinflation
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Model 3: Expected Inrlotion and Unemployment Determining Disinflation
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